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Gravity equationWe build a model of administrative barriers to trade to understand how they affect trade volumes, shipping
decisions and welfare. Because administrative costs are incurred with every shipment, exporters have to decide
how to break up total trade into individual shipments. Consumers value frequent shipments, because they enable
them to consume close to their preferred dates. Hence per-shipment costs create a welfare loss.
We derive a gravity equation in our model and show that administrative costs can be expressed as bilateral
ad-valorem trade costs. We estimate the ad-valorem equivalent in Spanish shipment-level export data and
ﬁnd it to be large. A 50% reduction in per-shipment costs is equivalent to a 9 percentage point reduction in tariffs.
Ourmodel and estimates help explainwhy policymakers emphasize trade facilitation andwhy tradewithin cus-
toms unions is larger than trade within free trade areas.
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Exporters and importers around the globe facemany administrative
barriers. They have to comply with complex regulations, deal with a
large amount paperwork, subject their cargo to frequent inspections,
and wait for lengthy customs clearance. Minimizing the burden
of these procedures, “trade facilitation” has been a priority for
policymakers from developed and developing countries alike. In
December of 2013, all members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) have agreed to the Bali Package, the ﬁrst comprehensive agree-
ment of theDoha roundof negotiations. Themain component of the Bali
Package is an agreement on trade facilitation, requiring WTO members“EFIGE” project funded by the
e/Socio-economic Sciences and
225551 and from the European
EFLOWS”). Hornok is thankful
Training Network (ITN)’ funded
ork Programme (Contract No.
emy of Sciences for the “Firms,
). We thank Costas Arkolakis,
an De Loecker, Jeffrey Frankel,
seminar participants at Yale,
oulouse and the International
ree anonymous referees for the
Hungary.
. This is an open access article underto adopt a host of measures streamlining the customs process, such as
pre-arrival processing of shipments, electronic documentation and
payment, and the release of goods prior to the ﬁnal determination
of customs duties, “[w]ith a view to minimizing the incidence and com-
plexity of import, export, and transit formalities and to decreasing and
simplifying import, export, and transit documentation requirements
[…]”1
Why do countries rush to facilitate trade? They hope to increase
trade volumes without endangering government revenues by reducing
inefﬁciencies. In fact, studies of various trade facilitation measures ﬁnd
that they are associated with larger trade volumes.2 Even among
countries within free trade areas (FTAs), tighter economic integration
and a reduction of administrative barriers often lead to higher trade.3
We build a model of administrative barriers to trade to understand
how they affect trade volumes, shipping decisions and welfare. A large1 World Trade Organization (2013), Article 10, 1.1.
2 See Engman (2005) and Francois et al. (2005) for a survey of the empirical evidence.
Moïsé et al. (2011) construct various trade facilitation indicators and ﬁnd that, taken to-
gether, they can reduce trade costs by up to 10%.
3 Hornok (2012) ﬁnds that countries joining the European Union (EU) in 2004 have
witnessed a 5% reduction in trade costs even though they already had FTAs with the EU
since the mid-1990s. Handley and Limão (2012) ﬁnd similar trade-creating effect of the
EU accession for Portugal. Chen and Novy (2011) estimate that EU countries within the
Schengen area, which are not subject to border control, enjoy 10% lower trade frictions
than other EU countries.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ment, such as ﬁlling in customs declaration and other forms, or having
the cargo inspected by health and sanitary ofﬁcials. Hornok and Koren
(in press) document that countries with high administrative barriers
to importing (as reported in the Doing Business survey of the World
Bank) receive less frequent and larger shipments. The starting point of
our model is hence a tradeoff between administrative costs and ship-
ping frequency. In the presence of per-shipment administrative costs,
exporters would want to send fewer and larger shipments. However,
an exporter waiting to ﬁll a container before sending it off or choosing
a slower transport mode to accommodate a larger shipment sacriﬁces
timely delivery of goods and risks losing orders to other, more ﬂexible
(e.g., local) suppliers. With infrequent shipments a supplier of such
products can compete only for a fraction of consumers in a foreign
market.
We ﬁrst use ourmodel to derive amodiﬁed gravity equation of trade
ﬂows, in which administrative barriers show up as an additional tax
on imports. Intuitively, when administrative barriers are high and
shipments are infrequent, customers suffer utility losses that can be
quantiﬁed as an ad-valorem tax equivalent. They also substitute
towards local products accordingly.
We then show how to measure the welfare losses from administra-
tive barriers to trade by estimating two key elasticities from the data.
First,we need to know the sensitivity of consumers to timely shipments.
This can be recovered from the observed shipping choices of exporters:
if customers are very sensitive to timeliness, ﬁrms send many small
shipments. Second, we need to estimate shippers' reaction to adminis-
trative costs. Calculating deadweight losses from the elasticity of
consumer and ﬁrm behavior to prices is in the spirit of semi-structural
estimation of Harberger (1964), Chetty (2009) and Arkolakis et al.
(2012).
In our empirical analysis, we ﬁrst show that per-shipment trade
costs are sizeable and important for trade ﬂows. We use the Doing
Business database tomeasure the cost of shipping. Across 161 countries,
the average trade shipment was subject to $3000 shipping cost in 2009.
High shipping costs are associated with low volumes of trade: country
pairs at the 25th percentile of per-shipment costs trade 68% more
than country pairs at the 75th percentile. This magnitude is comparable
to the trade creating effect of sharing a common border.
Administrative barriers of trade are larger in poor countries than in
rich ones. Doubling the income of an importing country is associated
with a 6% decrease in per-shipment costs. This pattern is consistent
with the fact reported byWaugh (2010) that poor countries have higher
trade barriers than rich ones,without correspondingly higher consumer
prices of tradables. In our model, administrative barriers affect the con-
venience of imports and hence trade volumes, but not consumer prices.
In addition, we ﬁnd that administrative costs help explain trade
ﬂows among countries with no preferential trade agreements and
even within FTAs, but not within customs unions. One potential reason
for this is that customs unions are subject to much less administrative
barriers than FTAs and our measured administrative costs do not
apply. In fact, this could provide a new explanation forwhy tradewithin
customs unions is higher than trade within FTAs.4 Traditionally, the
analysis of FTAs relative to customs unions focused on tariff harmoniza-
tion, rules of origin and political economy (Krueger, 1997 and Frankel
et al., 1997, 1998).
We then study how exporters break down trade into shipments by
exploiting shipment-level data for Spain for the period 2006–2012.
We ﬁnd that countries facing higher administrative barriers receive
fewer shipments. This is similar to the ﬁnding of Hornok and Koren
(in press).
Using our estimated elasticity of the number of shipments with
respect to per-shipment costs, we can calibrate the welfare effect of4 See, for example, Roy (2010) and also Section 4 of this paper.these costs. We conduct two counterfactual trade facilitation experi-
ments in the model. In the ﬁrst one we reduce per-shipment costs by
half. In the model, this is equivalent to about a 9% reduction in tariffs
and results in about a 31% increase in trade volumes. The second exer-
cise harmonizes administrative barriers so that each country matches
the per-shipment cost of the average country in the top decile of GDP
per capita. Because richer countries have lower trade barriers, this typ-
ically involves a reduction in per shipment costs. The tariff-equivalent
effects of this policy vary substantially with development, being 13%
for the lowest income decile and 2% for the highest.
Our counterfactual exercises suggest large trade creating effects of
trade facilitation and large distributional effects from harmonizing
administrative barriers.
Our emphasis on shipments as a fundamental unit of trade follows
Armenter and Koren (2014), who discuss the implications of the rela-
tively low number of shipments on empirical models of the extensive
margin of trade.
We relate to the recent literature that challenges the dominance of
iceberg trade costs in trade theory, such as Hummels and Skiba (2004)
and Irarrazabal et al. (2013) They argue that a considerable part of
trade costs are per unit costs, which has important implications for
trade theory. Per unit trade costs do not necessarily leave the within-
market relative prices and relative demand unaltered, hence, welfare
costs of per unit trade frictions can be larger than those of iceberg costs.5
The importance of per-shipment trade costs or, in other words, ﬁxed
transaction costs has recently been emphasized by Alessandria et al.
(2010). They also argue that per-shipment costs lead to the lumpiness
of trade transactions: ﬁrms economize on these costs by shipping
products infrequently and in large shipments andmaintaining large in-
ventory holdings. Per-shipment costs cause frictions of a substantial
magnitude (20% tariff equivalent) mostly due to inventory carrying ex-
penses. We consider our paper complementary to Alessandria et al.
(2010) in that we exploit the cross-country variation in administrative
barriers to show that shippers indeed respond by increasing the lump-
iness of trade. Relative to their work, our focus is on characterizing
the welfare consequences of administrative barriers in a simple-to-
calibrate framework. We can do this by leveraging the semi-structural
approach.
Our work is most related to Kropf and Sauré (2014), who build a
heterogeneous-ﬁrm trademodel to study how ﬁxed costs per shipment
affect shipment size. They characterize the size and frequency of
shipments as a function of ﬁrm productivity, and also show that aggre-
gate exports follow from ﬁrm-level trade patterns. They then recover
shipment costs from the observed shipment sizes, showing that these
imputed costs are large and correlate plausibly with geographic
variables and trade agreements. Given our lack of ﬁrm-level data, our
model is admittedly simpler, but our focus here is also different: we
want to understand the welfare consequences of administrative trade
costs in a tractable aggregate framework. For this purpose, we derive a
standard gravity equation in our model, and show how our model
can be calibrated using a limited set of aggregate moments. We also
offer new evidence on the trade effects of administrative barriers within
and outside customs unions and conduct various counterfactual
experiments.
2. A model of the shipping frequency of trade
This section presents a model that determines the number and
timing of shipments to be sent to a destination market. Sending
shipments more frequently is beneﬁcial, because consumers value
timely shipments. Producers engage in monopolistic competition asHummels and Skiba (2004) obtain an interesting side result on a rich panel data set,
which is consistent with the presence of per-shipment costs. The per unit freight cost de-
pends negatively on total traded quantity. Hence, the larger the size of a shipment in terms
of product units, the less the per-unit freight cost is.
S112 C. Hornok, M. Koren / Journal of International Economics 96 (2015) S110–S122consumers value the differentiated products they offer. Each producer
can then send multiple shipments to better satisfy the demands of its
consumers.
There are J countries, each hosting an exogenous number of sellers
and consumers. A seller can sell to a domestic consumer at no shipping
cost. It can also sell to a foreign destination j, in which case it has to pay
iceberg shipping costs as well as the administrative cost of exporting to
country j.
The difference between administrative barriers and other trade costs
is that the former apply for every shipment. We hence model them as
per-shipment costs that are pure waste.
We characterize the shipping problemof sellers, and derive a gravity
equation for trade ﬂows between countries. We show that administra-
tive costs act as an ad-valorem tax on bilateral trade. We then discuss
the welfare implications of administrative costs, deriving a semi-
structural formula for consumer surplus in the spirit of Harberger
(1964), Chetty (2009) and Arkolakis et al. (2012).2.1. Consumers
There is a unit mass of consumers in every destination country j.6
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their preferred date of
consumption: some need the good on January 1, some on January 2,
etc. The preferred date is indexed by t ∈ [0, 1], and can be represented
by points on a circle.7 The distribution of t across consumers is uniform,
that is, there are no seasonal effects in demand.
Consumers are willing to consume at a date other than their
preferred date, but they incur a cost doing so. In the spirit of the trade
literature, wemodel the cost of substitutionwith an iceberg transaction
cost.8 A consumer with preferred date t who consumes one unit of the
good at date s only enjoys e−δ|t − s| effective units. The parameter δ N 0
captures the taste for timeliness.9 Consumers are more willing to
purchase at dates that are closer to their preferred date and they suffer
from early and late purchases symmetrically.
Other than the time cost, consumers value the shipments from the
same producer as perfect substitutes. The utility of a type-t consumer
purchasing from producer ω is
X j t;ωð Þ ¼
X
s∈S ωð Þ
e−δjt−sjxj t;ω; sð Þ: ð1Þ
Clearly, because of perfect substitution, the consumer will only
purchase the shipment(s) with the closest shipping dates, as adjusted
by price, e−δ|t − s|/ps.
The consumer has constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) prefer-
ences over the bundles Xj(t, ω) offered by different ﬁrms.
U j tð Þ ¼
Z
ω
X j t;ωð Þ1−1=σdω; ð2Þ
where σ is the elasticity of substitution. Let Ej denote the total income
and, in the absence of trade imbalances, total expenditure of consumers
in country j. By our assumption of symmetry, all consumer types have
the same income Ej(t) = Ej.6 Because preferences are homothetic, this is without loss of generality.
7 Note that this puts an upper bound of 12 on the distance between the ﬁrm and the con-
sumer. We are following the “circular city” discrete choice model of Salop (1979).
8 This is different from the tradition of address models that feature linear or quadratic
costs, but gives more tractable results.
9 As an alternative, but mathematically identical interpretation, we may say that the
consumer has to incur time costs of waiting or consuming too early (e.g., storage) so that
the total price paid by her is proportional to eδ|t − s|.2.2. Exporters
There is a ﬁxed Mi measure of ﬁrms producing in each country i.
Because there are no entry costs, each ﬁrm exports to each destination
country j.10
Exporters decide howmany shipments to send at what times. Send-
ing a shipment incurs a per-shipment cost of fij. They then decide how to
price their product. Both decisions are done simultaneously by the
ﬁrms.
Themarginal cost of production of supplierω is constant at c(ω).11 It
takes gross iceberg costs tij N 1 for goods to reach country j from country
i. This involves the per-unit costs of shipping, such as freight charges
and insurance (it does not include per-shipment costs.) The
cost-insurance-freight value of a good in country j is hence c(ω)tij. We
abstract from capacity constraints in shipping, that is, any amount can
be shipped to the country at this marginal costs.
Hence the total cost of getting a shipment with xj(ω) units of the
good to consumers in country j from country i (the home country of
ﬁrm ω) is
c ωð Þti jx j ωð Þ þ f i j:
Because we do not study free entry, we abstract from entry costs for
both production and market access.
Given this cost structure, we can write the proﬁt function of a
producer ω from country i selling to country j as
π j ωð Þ ¼
Z
t
X
s¼s1 ; :: :;snj ωð Þ
pj t;ω; sð Þ−c ωð Þti j
h i
xj t;ω; sð Þdt−nj ωð Þ f i j: ð3Þ
Net revenue is markup times the quantity sold to all different types
of consumers at different shipping dates. The per-shipment costs have
to be incurred based on the number of shipping dates, whichwe denote
by nj(ω).12
2.3. Equilibrium
An equilibrium of this economy is a product price pj(t, ω, s), the
number of shipments per ﬁrm nj(ω), and quantity xj(t, ω, s) such that
(i) consumer demand maximizes utility, (ii) prices maximize ﬁrm
proﬁts given other ﬁrms' prices, (iii) shipping frequency maximizes
ﬁrm proﬁts conditional on the shipping choices of other ﬁrms, and
(iv) goods markets clear.
To construct the equilibrium, we move backwards. We ﬁrst solve
the pricing decision of the ﬁrm at given shipping dates. We then
show that shipments are going to be equally spaced throughout the
year. Given the revenues the ﬁrm is collecting from n equally spaced
and optimally priced shipments, we can solve for the optimal num-
ber of shipments.
2.3.1. Pricing
The revenue function of ﬁrm ω for its shipment at time s, coming
from consumer t is
Rj t;ω; sð Þ ¼ maxp E j tð Þ
peδjs−tj
Pj tð Þ
" #1−σ
; ð4Þ10 The working paper version of Hornok and Koren (2012) endogenizes the measure of
exporters via free entry into each destination j.
11 We will later assume symmetry across ﬁrms from the same country—a Krugman
(1980) model. For now, however, we keep the dependence on ω in notation to illustrate
how our model can be extended in a Melitz (2003) framework.
12 Clearly, the ﬁrm would not send two shipments on the same date, as it would only
reach the same type of consumers. More on the equilibrium shipping dates below.
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product, and
P j tð Þ ¼
Z
ω
pj ωð Þ1−σe− σ−1ð Þδjt−s ωð Þjdω
 1= 1−σð Þ
is the ideal price index of consumer t.
Because there is a continuumof competitors, an individual ﬁrm does
not affect the price index Pj(t) nor expenditure Ej(t). This implies that
the ﬁrm's demand is isoelastic with elasticity σ. As a consequence, the
ﬁrm will follow the inverse elasticity rule in its optimal pricing,
pj ωð Þ ¼
σ
σ−1 ci ωð Þti j: ð5Þ
Price is a constant markup over the constant marginal cost. Firms
may be heterogeneous in their marginal cost because of differences in
productivity or factor prices in their source country. Importantly, a
given ﬁrm charges the same price for each shipment date.
2.3.2. Shipping dates
Clearly, revenue (4) is concave in |s− t|, the deviation of shipping
times from optimal. Because of that, the ﬁrm would like to keep ship-
ments equally distant from all consumers. This implies that shipments
will be equally spaced, s2− s1 = s3 − s2 = …= 1/n. The date of the
ﬁrst shipment is indeterminate, and we assume that ﬁrms randomize
across all possible dates uniformly.
Because all shipments have the same price, consumers will pick
the one closest to their preferred date t (other shipments are strictly
inferior.) The set of consumers purchasing from a particular shipment
s is t∈½s− 12n ; sþ 12nÞ.
An equal-spaced shipping equilibrium is shown on Fig. 1.
2.3.3. Revenue
To obtain the revenue from a shipment s, we integrate across the set
of buyers buying from that shipment,
Rj ω; sð Þ ¼
Z sþ 12n
t¼s− 12n
E j tð Þ
pj ωð Þ
P j tð Þ
" #1−σ
e− σ−1ð Þδjs−tjdt
¼ E j
p j ωð Þ
P j
" #1−σZ sþ 12n
t¼s− 12n
e− σ−1ð Þδjs−tjdt;
where we have exploited the symmetry of consumers.
The integral in the last term evaluates to
Z sþ 12n
t¼s− 12n
e− σ−1ð Þδjs−tjdt ¼ 2  1−e
−12 σ−1ð Þδ=n
σ−1ð Þδ :Fig. 1. Symmetric equilibrium shipping dates.Because of the symmetry of consumers, each shipment brings the
same revenue. The revenue from all shipments is then
Rj ωð Þ ¼ nj ωð ÞRj ω; sð Þ ¼ E j
pj ωð Þ
P j
" #1−σ
1−e−
1
2 σ−1ð Þδ=n j ωð Þ
1
2
σ−1ð Þδ=nj ωð Þ
: ð6Þ
Let rj(ω) denote the revenue of the ﬁrm if it sends timely shipments
(n→ ∞),
r j ωð Þ ¼ E j
pj ωð Þ
P j
" #1−σ
;
and τ(n) denote the ad-valorem equivalent of infrequent shipments,
τ nð Þ ¼
1
2 σ−1ð Þδ=n
1−e−12 σ−1ð Þδ=n
" #1= σ−1ð Þ
:
The function τ(n) is independent of j orω. We canwrite the revenue
of a ﬁrm ω as
Rj ωð Þ ¼ r j ωð Þτ nj ωð Þ
h i1−σ
: ð7Þ
The revenue of a ﬁrm is the product of two components: one
depending only on market size and relative price as in a Krugman
model, the other solely a function of shipping frequency. The ad-
valorem equivalent of infrequent shipping, τ(n), has the following
properties. It is decreasing in n: the more shipments the ﬁrm sends
the more consumers it can reach at a low utility cost. Because they
appreciate the close shipping dates, they will perceive this ﬁrm as
relatively cheap. At the extreme, if n→ ∞, τ(n) converges to 1, and the
ﬁrm sells r(ω). From the ﬁrm's point of view, the demand for timely
shipping is fully captured by the function τ(n), which acts as an ad-
valorem tax on the ﬁrm's product. Later we will show that this analogy
also applies to welfare calculations.
With this notation, we can write the price index of consumers in
country j as
P j ¼
Z
ω
pj ωð Þ1−στ nj ωð Þ
h i1−σ
dω
 1= 1−σð Þ
:
2.3.4. Number of shipments
The ﬁrm cares about the net revenue coming from its sales. Because
markup is constant, net revenue is just a constant 1/σ fraction of gross
revenue. Choosing the proﬁt-maximizing number of shipments
involves maximizing
r j ωð Þτ nð Þ1−σ
σ
−nf i j
with respect to n. Net revenue is rj(ω)τ(n)1− σ/σ and each shipment
incurs the per-shipment cost fij. Revenue Rj only depends on the number
of shipments through τ(n).
Proposition 1. The proﬁt-maximizing number of shipments is implicitly
given by
dRj=σ
dn
¼ 1−σ
σ
r j ωð Þτ nð Þ−στ0 nð Þ ¼ f i j: ð8Þ
It increases in δ (less patient consumers), increases in σ (consumers
willing to substitute to other ﬁrms), increases in Ej/Pj (bigger ﬁrms in
equilibrium) and decreases in fij (costly shipments).
The number of shipments only depends on the ratio ofmaximal ﬁrm
size rj(ω) and per-shipment cost fij. Everything that makes the ﬁrm
13 An alternative way to close the model would be to assume free entry of exporters. In
this case, proﬁts would be zero, and consumer incomewould be simplywage income. This
would also be unchanged if both production costs and per shipment costs were
denominated in labor.
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production and shipping) increases the optimal frequency of shipments.
Large ﬁrms losemore by not satisfying their customers' need for timeli-
ness and they are willing to incur per-shipment costs more frequently.
Intuitively, lower per-shipment costs also imply more frequent ship-
ments. At the extreme, as fij tends to zero, the ﬁrm sends instantaneous
shipments, nj(ω)→ ∞ and τ converges to one.
To anticipate the calculation of the welfare effect, we rewrite Eq. (8)
as an expression of an elasticity,
−nj ωð Þτ0 nj ωð Þ
h i
τ nj ωð Þ
h i ¼ σ
σ−1
nj ωð Þ f i j
R j ωð Þ
: ð9Þ
The left-hand side of this equation is the absolute value of the elastic-
ity of τwith respect to n. The right-hand side is a constantmarkup times
total shipping costs paid by the ﬁrm (nf), divided by total revenue of the
ﬁrm. The last fraction can hence be thought of as the ad-valorem
amount of shipping costs.
The intuition for this result is that the more elastic τ is with respect
to the number of shipments, the less willing is the ﬁrm to sacriﬁce
revenue with infrequent shipments. It will hence send many small
shipments, making the ad-valorem amount of shipping costs large.
We can use this formula to recover the elasticity of τ from the data.
2.3.5. Trade ﬂows
The analysis so far is conditional on ﬁrm-level unit costs. To derive
aggregate trade ﬂows, we need to take a stand on these costs. Because
wedonot haveﬁrm-level data,we take the simple view thatﬁrmswith-
in the same country are identical in their cost of production, ci(ω) ≡ ci.
An alternative approach, pursued by Kropf and Sauré (2014) would be
to assume heterogeneous ﬁrms with Pareto-distributed unit costs.
Chaney (2008) and Arkolakis et al. (2012) discuss under what
conditions such a heterogeneous-ﬁrm model leads to a similar gravity
equation to the one we derive below.
Given the symmetry in costs, ﬁrms charge the same price in a given
destination country j,
pj ωð Þ ¼
σ
σ−1 citi j
and the price index can be written as
P j ¼
σ
σ−1
X
i
Mic
1−σ
i t
1−σ
i j τ ni j
 1−σ" #1= 1−σð Þ
: ð10Þ
The source countries differ in the number of exporters Mi, the
marginal cost of production ci, the iceberg trade cost tij, and the
ad-valorem loss from infrequent shipments τ(nij). All these enter the
price index of consumers.
Proposition 2. The total value of exports from country i to country j is
given by
Ti j ¼
EiE j
Ew
t1−σi j τ ni j
 1−σ
eΠ1−σi eP1−σj ;
with
eΠ1−σi ≡X
j
E j
Ew
t1−σi j τ ni j
 1−σePσ−1j
and
eP1−σj ≡X
i
Ei
Ew
eΠσ−1i t1−σi j τ ni j 1−σ :This is exactly the gravity equation in Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) and Eaton and Kortum (2002), except for the additional term
τ(nij). Infrequent shipment hence acts as a bilateral trade cost between
countries. We can use this insight to calculate the magnitude of trade
losses from administrative barriers.
3. Welfare
What is the welfare cost of administrative barriers? Here we
calculate how welfare depends on the choice of shipping frequency.
The utility of the representative consumer is a monotonic function of
real income Ej/Pj. We hence need to calculate the income and the price
index faced by the representative consumer.
Our gravity equation satisﬁes Restriction 3 (CES import demand) of
Arkolakis et al. (2012), but not Restriction 2 (constant proﬁt shares) and
Restriction 3 (identical elasticity of trade ﬂows to wages and trade
costs). This is because proﬁt net of shipping costs is a nonlinear function
of revenue and trade policy hence also changes the proﬁt to cost ratio of
the economy.We thus cannot use the result of Arkolakis et al. (2012) to
characterize welfare across all equilibria. We can still use a loglinear
approximation around the equilibrium to show how the additional
inconvenience from an inﬁnitesimal increase in shipping costs maps
into welfare losses for the consumer.
Because we only consider changes to fij when analyzing welfare, we
can treat customer income Ej as ﬁxed as long as j is a small country. In
this case, changes in the proﬁts of exporters in country i do not matter
for consumer income in country j. We can focus on changes to the
price index.13
Recall from Eq. (10) the price index
P j ¼
σ
σ−1
X
i
Mic
1−σ
i t
1−σ
i j τ ni j
 1−σ" #1= 1−σð Þ
:
As the constantmarkup formula shows, individual product prices do
not depend on nij or fij. We are hence interested in how τ changes. We
begin by log differentiating the price index with respect to the number
of shipments per ﬁrm nij,
d ln P j
d ln ni j
¼ − Ti j
E j
−ni jτ0 ni j
 
τ ni j
  :
Countries that receive more shipments have lower perceived prices
and higher customer utility. The effect on the price index depends on
the size of the trade ﬂow (timely shipments from a small trade partner
being less important) and on the elasticity of τwith respect to n. We can
use Eq. (9) to substitute in for this elasticity,
d lnP j
d lnni j
¼ − σ
σ−1
Ti j
E j
ni j f i j
Ri j
:
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The elasticity of the price index with respect to the
per-shipment cost is given by
d lnP j ¼
X
i
Ti j
E j
ψi j d ln f i j;
Table 1
Average per-shipment costs across countries.
Exporting Importing
Monetary Time Monetary Time
Document preparation $275 12.0 $307 13.8
Customs clearance and inspection $160 3.0 $207 3.7
Port and terminal handling $282 4.1 $318 4.7
Transit from port to destination $670 5.0 $772 4.6
Total $1387 24.1 $1604 26.8
Note: Based onDoing Business survey from2009. Time costs are indays,monetary costs in
US dollars.
Table 2
Covariates of shipping costs.
Exporter GDP (log) −0.017a
(0.001)
Importer GDP (log) −0.020a
(0.001)
Exporter GDP per capita PPP (log) −0.060a
(0.003)
Importer GDP per capita PPP (log) −0.086a
(0.003)
Free trade area (dummy) −0.131a
(0.010)
Customs union (dummy) 0.010
(0.015)
Exporter is island (dummy) −0.099a
(0.007)
Importer is island (dummy) −0.025a
(0.007)
Distance (log) −0.048a
(0.004)
Adjacent country (dummy) −0.028
(0.022)
Former colony (dummy) 0.119a
(0.018)
Common colonizer (dummy) −0.093a
(0.010)
Same country ever (dummy) −0.053b
(0.025)
Common language (dummy) 0.061a
(0.008)
Common currency (dummy) 0.166a
(0.021)
Common legal origin (dummy) −0.027a
(0.006)
Bilateral tariff (log) −0.128a
(0.035)
Constant 10.515a
(0.051)
Observations 22,479
R-squared 0.253
Note: Dependent variable is log total export plus import cost per shipment. The full
sample includes thepairs of 178 exporting and 148 importing countries in 2006. The
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ψi j ¼
σ
1−σ
d lnni j
d ln f i j
ni j f i j
Ri j
:
The welfare effect of a change in per-shipment costs is a weighted
average across source countries. The contribution of country i to this
welfare effect is ψij. We use this result in the counterfactual exercise in
Section 5 when we estimate ψij.
4. Evidence on administrative barriers and trade
We study how administrative barriers affect trade ﬂows. We ﬁrst
estimate a gravity equation for bilateral trade volumes, including cost
of shipping as an additional bilateral trade cost. We then show how
shipping costs affect the number of shipments going to a country.
4.1. Data and measurement
We identify administrative costs from the Doing Business survey of
the World Bank, from 2006 to 2012 (World Bank, 2014a). Doing Busi-
nessmeasures the costs of exporting and importing a standard contain-
erized cargo, noting the various customsand administrative procedures,
documents, and the time andmoney they take. Ourmeasure of shipping
costs is the total monetary cost per shipment incurred by the exporter
and the importer. Although not all components of these costs are strictly
administrative, these correspond to the per-shipment cost in our
model.14
Table 1 reports the average shipping costs across countries, broken
down by the type of procedure and the direction of trade (export or
import). Taken together, the average trade transactionwould be subject
to a total of $3000 cost and a waiting time of 50 days.
To study the covariates (though not necessarily determinants) of
administrative barriers, we regress the log total per shipment costs
(including both exporting and importing costs) on a host of country
and country-pair observables. Table 2 reports the results. Administra-
tive barriers tend to be lower for larger and richer countries that are
closer to one another and are members of an FTA.
By far themost variation in administrative barriers is due to the level
of development of the exporter and the importer. Doubling the GDP per
capita of an importer is associated with a 6% decline in per-shipment
trade costs. Twice as rich exporters, in turn, have 4% lower shipping
costs. Motivated by this observation, we will study the effects of the
counterfactual policy of reducing administrative barriers to rich-
country levels.15
Data on trade ﬂows comes from the UN Comtrade database (United
Nations, 2014). We use bilateral distance measures and geographical
variables from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2011), and gross domestic
product data from the World Bank (World Bank, 2014b). To estimate
how shipping choices depend on administrative costs, we need infor-
mation on shipments. We use the shipment-level export database of
the Spanish Agencia Tributaria (Agencia Tributaria, 2014). This contains
information on every single international shipment leaving Spain. It re-
cords the date of shipment, its product code, value and weight, destina-
tion and transit countries, and the speciﬁcs of shipping, such as the
mode of transport, the ﬂag of vessel andwhether the cargo is container-
ized.Agencia Tributariadoes notmake ﬁrm identiﬁers available, so, even
though each shipment ismadeby a single ﬁrm,we cannot conductﬁrm-
level analysis.
Table 3 reports some shipment-level statistics about Spanish export
in 2009. It shows, for selected destinations, the shipment value of the14 Hornok and Koren (in press) also discuss the various components of per-shipment
costs separately. Documentation and customs take about the third of the monetary costs
and two thirds of the time costs of shipping.
15 We thank a referee for suggesting this policy exercise.median product, the number of times it is shipped in a month, and the
number of months it is shipped in a year. Our ﬁrst observation is that
shipments are relatively large and infrequent. The average shipment
size across all importers is $13,234 and the typical product only ships
twice a year to the typical destination. This observation, noted before
by Armenter and Koren (2014) and Hornok and Koren (in press), moti-
vated us to model shipments as infrequently spread through time. We
also ﬁnd that countries with lower per-shipment costs receive smaller
and more frequent shipments.
In our model, a shipment can only contain a single type of product
from a single ﬁrm. In practice, shipments may be consolidated. Multi-
product ﬁrms may send different products or freight forwarders may
send cargo of different ﬁrms in the same shipment. To check howregression includes dummies for the continent of both exporter and importer. Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses. See Section 4.2 for details on variable
deﬁnitions.
a Signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Signiﬁcant at 5%.
Table 3
Shipping costs and frequency.
Median shipment
value (US$)
Number of times good
shipped in a month
Number of months in
year good shipped
Selected low per-shipment cost importers
France $14,203 1.5 9
Germany $14,217 1.3 7
Japan $9674 1.0 2
USA $15,592 1.0 3
Selected high per-shipment cost importers
Algeria $15,894 1.0 2
China $19,442 1.0 2
Russia $12,263 1.0 2
South Africa $11,725 1.0 2
All importers $13,234 1.0 2
Notes: Reproduced from Hornok and Koren (in press), Table 2. Spanish exports to 144
non-EU and 25 EU importers in 2009 in 8381 eight-digit product lines (N = 3,019,277).
The median value of individual shipments is converted to U.S. dollars with monthly aver-
age USD/EUR exchange rates. Shipment frequency statistics are for the median product.
Trade in fuels and low-value shipments (less than EUR 2000 for Spain) are excluded.
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ments. For this exercise, we deﬁne a shipment based on shipping char-
acteristics alone (such as date, ﬁnal and transit country, vessel,
containerization), while ignoring information on the product or its
value. The vast majority, close to 60%, of such shipments contains only
a single product item. We hence view the single-product, single-ﬁrm
approximation of our model as empirically relevant.
In order to differentiate customs unions from free trade areas, we
use the May 2013 version of the database created by Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) to measure economic integration agreements.
Because that data ends in 2005 and Doing Business starts in 2006, we
use the year 2006 in our estimation of trade volumes.
4.2. Trade volumes
We ﬁrst estimate a gravity equation of bilateral imports. We are
interested in the trade-creating effect of customs unions relative to
free trade areas, as well as the effects of per-shipment costs.
Our main speciﬁcation is derived from Proposition 2. We let the
iceberg trade cost tij depend on geographic variables such as distance,
landlocked status, adjacency, colonial history, and the economic
integration of the countries, such as membership in FTA, tariff rates or
the use of a common currency. The ad-valorem equivalent of shipping
costs, τ(nij), in turn, depends on the per-shipment costs accrued by
exporters from country i to country j. The estimating equation is
lnTi j ¼ β0 þ β1 FTAi j þ β2CUi j þ β3ln f i j þ β4gravityi j þ ui j: ð11Þ
Imports from country i to country j depend on an FTA and a customs
union dummy, per-shipment costs, as well as standard gravity control
variables. Note that fij is the sum of export-speciﬁc costs in country i
and import-speciﬁc costs in country j.
The unilateral control variables include total nominal GDP, GDP per
capita in PPP terms (World Bank, 2014b), an indicator for whether the
country is an island, and an indicator for its continent (CEPII GeoDist16).
Bilateral controls include distance, adjacency, former colonial status, in-
dicators for common language, common currency and common legal
origins (CEPII GeoDist and Gravity17) and average bilateral tariff rate
(CEPII MacMap18). We also control for whether one or both country is
in the European Union, because within-EU trade data is collected
differently.1916 For description see Mayer and Zignago (2011).
17 See Head et al. (2013).
18 See Guimbard et al. (2012).
19 See Appendix B for a discussion.Table 4 reports the results. All speciﬁcations are estimated by
ordinary least squares (OLS). Columns 1 through 2 are estimated on
the full sample of 178 exporter countries and 148 importer countries.
The speciﬁcations vary by the degree of economic integration of the
country pairs. We include an FTA and a customs union dummy, as
well as ourmeasure of shipping costs. The omitted category of economic
integration includes country pairs with no trade agreement, or only
preferential trade agreements short of an FTA.
All standard gravity variables have the expected sign andmagnitude.
As column 1 shows, countries in FTAs trade much more with one
another than countries outside. An FTA is associated with a more than
two-fold increase in trade. We separate customs unions from FTAs.
Since all customs unions are also FTAs, the estimated effect of a customs
union is in addition to the effect of being in an FTA. That is, customs
unions are associated with a 44% increase in trade relative to FTAs.20
This is consistent with the model and the fact that customs unions
require much less administration than FTAs.
Column 2 reports the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to
per-shipment cost to be strongly negative at−1.06. The interquartile
range of per-shipment costs is $1900 to $3100. This implies that country
pairs at the 25th percentile of shipping costs trade 68% more than
country pairs at the 75th percentile.21
What is the relationship between administrative costs, FTAs and cus-
toms unions? To answer this question, we break the sample into three.
Column 3 includes country pairs that are not members of an FTA. Col-
umn 4 includes country pairs that are in an FTA but not in a customs
union. Column 5 includesmembers of customs unions. We are interest-
ed in how the effect of shipping costs varies across these samples. Since
the Doing Business survey asks about a standard cargo, it does not allow
for the special administrative provisions of FTAs and customs unions.
We ﬁnd that the negative effect of per-shipment cost is strong
among countries outside of FTAs. The effect is similar among FTA
members. The negative effect of shipping costs disappears for customs
union members. Indeed, for these country pairs, much of the shipping
costs do not apply, as there is no customs clearance and documentation
needs are much reduced.
Column 6 reports a regression in which we interact shipping cost
with FTA and customsunion indicators. This is different from the regres-
sions on the three subsamples in that other variables are restricted to
have the same coefﬁcient. Again, we see large negative association of
shipping costs with trade for non-FTA members, somewhat smaller
effects for FTA members, and the effect disappears for customs unions.
The differences between the three groups are highly signiﬁcant.4.3. Shipments
We then turn to see how exporters break down total trade into ship-
ments. We use shipment-level export data from Spain for the period
2006–2012. We identify the number of shipments nij as the total
number of shipments going from Spain to country j in given year. One
drawback of the Spanish data is that it contains no ﬁrm identiﬁers. We
thus cannot calculate the number of shipments per ﬁrm, so we use the
total number instead. Although admittedly a limitation, this measure
is consistent with the model, where all ﬁrms are symmetric, and the
total number of shipments Nij =Minij is just a constant multiple of the
number of shipments per ﬁrm.
Eq. (12) is our estimating equation. The log number of shipments
depends on per-shipment costs aswell as standard gravity variables, in-
cluding importer size (GDP), GDP per capita, distance, an island import-
er indicator, a former colony dummy, common language and legal20 This result is somewhat sensitive to howwe treat intra-EU trade. Table B.9 in Appendix B
provides additional robustness checks. Our preferred estimates range from 32% to 44%.
21 Although quite speculatively, we could explain the trade effects of customs unions if
they corresponded to a exp(−0.44/1.06) ⋅ 100 − 100 = 34 percent decrease in per-
shipment costs.
22 This p-value is calculated with standard errors clustered by destination. The White
heteroskedasticity-corrected p-value is 0.065.
Table 4
Gravity equation estimates for bilateral imports.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Full No FTA FTA but no CU CU Full
Free trade area (dummy) 0.799a 0.649a −6.813a
(0.066) (0.073) (1.618)
Customs union (dummy) 0.367a 0.523a −5.820b
(0.104) (0.140) (2.751)
Total export + import cost per shipment (log) −1.063a −1.108a −1.171a −0.364 −1.174a
(0.065) (0.069) (0.269) (0.367) (0.069)
FTA × shipping cost 0.976a
(0.214)
CU × shipping cost 0.749b
(0.365)
Exporter GDP (log) 1.264a 1.238a 1.265a 1.173a 0.962a 1.235a
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.050) (0.031) (0.012)
Importer GDP (log) 1.094a 1.072a 1.098a 1.018a 0.831a 1.069a
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.047) (0.032) (0.012)
Distance (log) −1.216a −1.298a −1.252a −1.099a −1.193a −1.288a
(0.032) (0.036) (0.042) (0.081) (0.102) (0.036)
Exporter GDP per capita PPP (log) −0.106a −0.070b −0.060c 0.039 0.102 −0.060b
(0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.121) (0.151) (0.030)
Importer GDP per capita PPP (log) −0.246a −0.246a −0.205a −0.583a −0.311c −0.228a
(0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.142) (0.163) (0.030)
Exporter is EU member (dummy) 0.254a 0.170b
(0.061) (0.072)
Importer is EU member (dummy) 0.438a 0.247a
(0.072) (0.080)
Both countries EU members (dummy) −1.152a −1.383a
(0.115) (0.151)
Exporter is island (dummy) 0.287a 0.311a 0.308a 0.182 −0.288b 0.297a
(0.049) (0.055) (0.060) (0.211) (0.144) (0.056)
Importer is island (dummy) 0.231a 0.306a 0.278a 0.793a 0.304c 0.292a
(0.052) (0.058) (0.063) (0.234) (0.155) (0.058)
Adjacent country (dummy) 0.359a 0.385a 0.738a 0.814a 0.001 0.351b
(0.130) (0.141) (0.221) (0.250) (0.196) (0.140)
Former colony (dummy) 0.625a 0.748a 0.835a 0.436c 0.911a 0.793a
(0.105) (0.114) (0.133) (0.223) (0.283) (0.114)
Common colonizer (dummy) 1.005a 1.028a 0.858a 1.376a 1.089a 0.994a
(0.077) (0.091) (0.099) (0.274) (0.363) (0.091)
Same country ever (dummy) 0.755a 0.424b 0.543c 0.476 −0.491c 0.361c
(0.171) (0.186) (0.323) (0.304) (0.298) (0.186)
Common language (dummy) 0.708a 0.693a 0.673a 0.495b 0.171 0.710a
(0.063) (0.071) (0.077) (0.220) (0.242) (0.071)
Common currency (dummy) −0.011 0.059 1.297a −2.059a −0.071 −0.203
(0.154) (0.159) (0.401) (0.678) (0.129) (0.156)
Common legal origin (dummy) 0.159a 0.219a 0.226a 0.461a 0.312a 0.222a
(0.044) (0.050) (0.055) (0.147) (0.105) (0.050)
Bilateral tariff (log) −0.673c −0.725c −0.218 −6.439a 5.262c −0.734c
(0.354) (0.421) (0.407) (2.050) (3.078) (0.420)
Constant −30.723a −20.791a −22.584a −15.058a −14.328a −20.063a
(0.420) (0.791) (0.865) (2.778) (3.866) (0.808)
Observations 19,125 14,490 12,688 1,049 753 14,490
R-squared 0.676 0.703 0.663 0.743 0.869 0.703
Note: Dependent variable is log import value. The full sample includes the pairs of 178 exporting and 148 importing countries in 2006. All regressions include dummies for the continent of
both exporter and importer. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a Signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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speciﬁc variables because they are soaked up by time dummies νt. One
speciﬁcation also includes an importer country ﬁxed effect μ j.
lnN0 jt ¼ β1ln f 0 jt þ β02gravity0 jt þ μ j þ νt þ u0 jt : ð12Þ
Table 5 reports the estimates. Because reporting standards are differ-
ent for intra-EU trade, we only include non-EU destinations.
Column 1 reports a simple OLS estimate for the 131 non-EU destina-
tions. Countries with higher per-shipment cost receive signiﬁcantly
fewer shipments, with an elasticity of−1.34. The interquartile range
of per-shipment costs for non-EU destinations is $2000 to $3000. A
country with $2000 per-shipment costs receives 72% more shipments
from Spain than a country with $3000 costs.Column 2 reports a speciﬁcation with destination ﬁxed effects. Such
ﬁxed effects can soak up any time-invariant heterogeneity across
countries and their relation to Spain. (This is why the gravity variables
are omitted.) The coefﬁcient of per-shipment costs is still negative but
no longer signiﬁcant, with a p-value of 0.235.22
The ﬁxed effect estimate is very noisy because there is little time-
series variation in administrative costs. An analysis of variance reveals
that 91% of the variation in log shipping cost is soaked by up destination
country dummies. An additional 5% can be attributed to common time
dummies, leaving about 4% idiosyncratic time variation.
Table 6
Effects of reducing per-shipment cost by income decile of importer.
Percentage tariff decline
equivalent to reducing
shipping costs
Income decile Average shipping cost By 50% To top decile level Average tariff
1 (lowest) $3558 11.6 13.4 11.7
2 $3134 8.9 6.4 11.8
3 $2972 10.3 8.6 13.5
4 $2434 8.7 6.1 11.4
5 $2351 7.4 2.0 8.0
6 $2246 10.4 1.4 9.6
7 $2817 12.1 5.9 8.7
Table 5
Shipping costs and the number of shipments.
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE RE
Total export + import cost per shipment (log) −1.342a −0.451 −0.764a
(0.212) (0.378) (0.246)
Importer GDP (log) 0.890a 0.511b 0.874a
(0.048) (0.256) (0.049)
Importer GDP per capita PPP (log) 0.266a 0.945b 0.361a
(0.086) (0.476) (0.105)
Importer is island (dummy) 0.522b 0.534b
(0.246) (0.247)
Distance (log) −1.381a −1.336a
(0.294) (0.291)
Former colony (dummy) −0.082 −0.025
(0.234) (0.244)
Common language (dummy) 1.803a 1.805a
(0.264) (0.255)
Common legal origin (dummy) 0.902a 0.963a
(0.165) (0.168)
Bilateral tariff (log) −2.274 −2.442
(1.986) (2.021)
Constant 6.390b −9.067c 0.974
(3.182) (5.080) (3.408)
Observations 892 892 892
R-squared 0.906 0.988
Number of countries 131 131 131
Note: Dependent variable is the log number of shipments. The sample includes exports
from Spain to 124 non-EU countries between 2006 and 2012. All speciﬁcations have
year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered by importing country.
a Signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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for time-invariant heterogeneity across countries, but restricts these
error terms to be orthogonal to explanatory variables and to have a nor-
mal distribution. Given these restrictions, the random effect estimator
uses both cross-section and time-series variation. The estimated elastic-
ity of the number of shipmentswith respect to shipping costs is−0.764.
Our preferred estimate of this elasticity is the more conservative
−0.451. We will use this estimate in the baseline counterfactual
exercise, and explore sensitivity to other values.
In Hornok and Koren (in press), we have estimated product-level re-
gressions to determine the elasticity of the number of shipments and
the average shipment sizewith respect to per-shipment costs. Countries
with higher per-shipment import costs receive fewer and larger ship-
ments fromboth theU.S. and Spain. The elasticity of the number of ship-
ments is between−0.262 and−0.104.23 Our estimates are larger. One
possible explanation is that there aremany zero tradeﬂows at the prod-
uct level, which biases a log-linear estimation. Missing trade is not an
issue at the country level with a large exporting country such as Spain.
Table 5 of Hornok and Koren (in press) also shows that shipments
are spread throughout the year: countries with high per-shipment
cost receive shipments in fewermonths. These empirical patternsmoti-
vated our model.
We also conducted an empirical analysis of the margins through
which exporters change their shipping frequency. Simply put, they
may (i) sendmore of the samegood in larger shipments, (ii) pick slower
modes of transport that allow for larger shipments and (iii) send bulkier
products instead of small products. We do an index-number analysis to
decompose the aggregate response into these channels. The results are
reported in Appendix C. The main results are that shipping frequency is
negatively associated with administrative costs even after controlling
formode of shipping, and that themode itself does not vary signiﬁcantly
with administrative barriers.23 Hornok and Koren (in press), Tables 3–4.5. The effects of a reduction in administrative costs
To quantify the effects of administrative costs in the model, we con-
duct two simple counterfactual exercises. In the ﬁrst trade facilitation
scenario, we reduce per-shipment costs fij by half. The second exercise
exploits the cross-country variation in administrative costs. We change
the administrative cost of each country to that of the average country in
the top income decile. Because poorer countries have higher shipping
costs, this scenario affects them more. The average import cost in the
top income decile is $942, whereas the average export cost is $913.
As seen from Propositions 2 and 3, both the trade volume and the
welfare effects are as if bilateral tariffs changed. We hence only need
to calculate the tariff equivalent changes, ψij. We can only do this for
the trade relations of Spain, because we need shipment-level data to
calibrate the ad-valorem equivalent of per-shipment costs. Because of
this data limitation and because our semi-structural approach only ap-
plies locally, the counterfactual exercises below should be understood
as partial equilibrium changes. More speciﬁcally, we do not study the
effect of the trade facilitation reform on ﬁrm proﬁts and the potential
spillovers across countries. We can however, characterize changes in
consumer surplus and changes in bilateral trade volumes as long as
the trade policy changes are small.
To calculate ψij, we need to know σ. Following Simonovska and
Waugh (2014), we calibrate σ= 4.1. This means that a 1% increase in
ad-valorem trade costs reduces trade by σ− 1 = 3.1%. It also implies
a 32% markup. We also report results with the estimates of Eaton and
Kortum (2002), σ= 8.2.
We set the value of dlnnij/dlnfij in Proposition 3 to − 0.451 from
Table 3. The ad-valorem amount of per-shipment costs is calculated
for each destination j as
f^ 0 jN0 j
T0 j
;
where f^ 0 j is the dollar measure of shipping costs in Doing Business with
the exporter being Spain, N0j is the total number of shipments from
Spain to country j, and T0j is total imports of country j from Spain.
Table 6 reports the average tariff equivalent effects of reducing fij
across the ten income deciles. The ﬁrst column reports the average
per-shipment cost in the income decile. Consistent with the evidence
presented in Table 2, poorer countries have higher shipping costs. The
second column reports the effects of reducing shipping costs by 50%.
For example, for the lowest income decile, such a policywould be equiv-
alent to an 11.6% decline in tariffs, whereas for the 9th decile, this would
be equivalent to a 5.2% tariff decline.
The effects are heterogeneous, because the effect of a shipping cost
reduction on the import price index is not linear (recall Proposition 3).8 $2332 8.5 2.1 7.6
9 $2394 5.2 1.5 10.3
10 (highest) $1992 10.8 1.9 5.3
Table 7
Tariff-equivalent effects (percent).
Shipment elasticity
−0.451 −0.764
Elasticity of substition (σ)
Scenario 4.1 8.2 4.1 8.2
50 percent decline 9.0 7.7 15.8 13.4
Matching top decile 4.5 3.9 7.7 6.6
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Fig. 2. Tariff equivalent of changing shipping costs to that of the top income decile.
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reduction.
The third column reports the tariff equivalent effect of setting each
administrative cost to the average of the top income decile. This effect
has a clear tendency with income per capita. Countries in the poorest
decile see an effect equivalent to a 13.4% tariff reduction, whereas the
average effect for countries in the 9th decile is 1.5% (note that even
importers in the top decile gain from Spain reducing its somewhat
higher-than-average shipping costs.)
For comparison, the last column of Table 6 shows the average bilat-
eral tariff rate with respect to Spain. Recall that only non-EU countries
are included in this exercise, hence, even for rich countries, the tariffs
are substantial. There is much less variation in statutory tariff rates
across income groups than in the tariff-equivalent effects of administra-
tive barriers. Hence a trade facilitation reform equalizing administrative
barriers offers a stronger force for convergence than a tariff harmoniza-
tion reform.5.1. Alternative calibrations
Table 7 reports the average tariff-equivalent effects across non-EU
countries for alternative calibrations for the shipment elasticity and
the elasticity of substitution. Reducing per-shipment costs by half is
equivalent to reducing tariffs by 7.7 to 15.8 percentage points. A larger
shipment elasticity (which implies that timeliness is more important)
corresponds to a larger gain from administrative barrier reduction.
The gain does not depend heavily on σ.
The average effects are smaller in the scenario where we match the
shipping cost of rich countries, because this corresponds to a smaller
than 50% reduction for most countries. The equivalent tariff reductions
range between 3.9 and 7.7%.
Table 8 reports the average percentage increases in bilateral imports
from Spain. Given that Spain is a small trade partner for most of the 131
countries, this exercise ignores third-country effects. Trade volumes go
up dramatically after this reduction in per-shipment costs, especially
for high σ. With σ= 8.2, the trade creating effect of trade facilitation
reform ranges from 31.3 to 148.0%. Even with σ= 4.1, we see a 14.6
to 57.5% trade increase. These magnitudes are comparable to the trade
creating effects of customs unions (Table 4).
There is a wide distribution of the effects across countries, because
they are subject to different per-shipment costs. Fig. 2 plots the tariff
equivalent of the per-shipment cost reduction for the cross-section of
non-EU countries. For the bulk of the countries, the counterfactual
trade facilitation reform is equivalent to 0 to 20% age point reduction
in tariffs.Table 8
Trade response (percent).
Shipment elasticity
−0.451 −0.764
Elasticity of substition (σ)
Scenario 4.1 8.2 4.1 8.2
50 percent decline 30.7 70.9 57.5 148.0
Matching top decile 14.6 31.3 25.9 58.66. Conclusion
We built a model of administrative barriers to trade to understand
how they affect trade volumes, shipping decisions and welfare. Because
administrative costs are incurred with every shipment, exporters have
to decide how to break up total trade into individual shipments.
Consumers value frequent shipments, because they enable them to con-
sume close to their preferred dates. Hence per-shipment costs create a
welfare loss.
We derived a gravity equation in ourmodel and showed that admin-
istrative costs can be expressed as bilateral ad-valorem trade costs. We
estimated the ad-valorem equivalent in Spanish shipment-level export
data and ﬁnd it to be large. A 50% reduction in per-shipment costs is
equivalent to a 9 percentage point reduction in tariffs. Our model and
estimates help explain why policy makers emphasize trade facilitation
and why trade within customs unions is larger than trade within free
trade areas.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
We can write ﬁrm revenue as
Ri j ¼ ri jτ ni j
 1−σ
;
where
ri j ¼ E j
c1−σi t
1−σ
i jX
k
Mkjc
1−σ
k t
1−σ
k j τ nkj
 1−σ
:
Total import from country i to country j is
Ti j ¼ Miri jτ ni j
 1−σ ¼ E j Mic1−σi t1−σi j τ ni j
 1−σ
X
k
Mkc
1−σ
k t
1−σ
k j τ nkj
 1−σ
:
With eP j denoting (1− 1/σ)Pj,
Ti j ¼ E jMic1−σi t1−σi j τ ni j
 1−σePσ−1j :
Add up all the sales of country i,
X
j
T i j ≡ Ei ¼ Mic1−σi
X
j
E jt
1−σ
i j τ ni j
 1−σePσ−1j :
24 We thank a referee for pointing out this problem.
Table B.9
FTAs, customs unions and trade ﬂows.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FTAs FTAs and CUs Non-EU sample EU dummies Nonzero trade (probit) Import (Poisson)
Free trade area (dummy) 0.805a 0.811a 0.796a 0.799a 0.055a 0.188b
(0.059) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.015) (0.098)
Customs union (dummy) −0.018 0.277a 0.367a 0.110a 0.228c
(0.082) (0.106) (0.104) (0.015) (0.106)
Exporter is EU member (dummy) 0.254a
(0.061)
Importer is EU member (dummy) 0.438a
(0.072)
Both countries EU members (dummy) −1.152a
(0.115)
Exporter GDP (log) 1.263a 1.263a 1.276a 1.264a 0.089a 0.862a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.025)
Importer GDP (log) 1.099a 1.099a 1.110a 1.094a 0.083a 0.848a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.020)
Distance (log) −1.192a −1.192a −1.197a −1.216a −0.100a −0.648a
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.004) (0.051)
Exporter GDP per capita PPP (log) −0.101a −0.101a −0.108a −0.106a −0.023a −0.047
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.003) (0.055)
Importer GDP per capita PPP (log) −0.233a −0.233a −0.238a −0.246a −0.019a −0.084b
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.003) (0.046)
Exporter is island (dummy) 0.286a 0.286a 0.307a 0.287a 0.041a −0.125
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.006) (0.084)
Importer is island (dummy) 0.232a 0.232a 0.248a 0.231a 0.043a −0.074
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.006) (0.078)
Adjacent country (dummy) 0.358a 0.359a 0.465a 0.359a −0.184a 0.255a
(0.131) (0.131) (0.144) (0.130) (0.043) (0.098)
Former colony (dummy) 0.720a 0.720a 0.724a 0.625a −0.062 −0.093
(0.106) (0.106) (0.109) (0.105) (0.064) (0.123)
Common colonizer (dummy) 1.003a 1.004a 0.981a 1.005a 0.032a 0.307
(0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.007) (0.198)
Same country ever (dummy) 0.855a 0.856a 0.765a 0.755a 0.127a 0.487b
(0.171) (0.171) (0.188) (0.171) (0.011) (0.270)
Common language (dummy) 0.721a 0.721a 0.711a 0.708a 0.084a 0.313a
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.006) (0.102)
Common currency (dummy) −0.074 −0.066 0.352 −0.011 −0.068c 0.042
(0.151) (0.155) (0.241) (0.154) (0.033) (0.085)
Common legal origin (dummy) 0.165a 0.165a 0.158a 0.159a 0.020a 0.029
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.005) (0.070)
Bilateral tariff (log) −0.792c −0.793c −0.746c −0.673b 0.039 −6.611a
(0.357) (0.357) (0.356) (0.354) (0.029) (1.018)
Constant −31.133a −31.132a −31.525a −30.723a −32.013a
(0.412) (0.412) (0.416) (0.420) (0.889)
Observations 19,125 19,125 18,663 19,125 30,764 30,764
R-squared 0.675 0.675 0.656 0.676
Note. Dependent variable is log import value. The full sample includes the pairs of 178 exporting and 148 importing countries in 2006. All regressions include dummies for the continent of
both exporter and importer. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a Signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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1−σ
i ¼
EiX
j
E jt
1−σ
i j τ ni j
 1−σePσ−1j :
Let
eΠ1−σi ≡X
j
E j
Ew
t1−σi j τ ni j
 1−σePσ−1j
so that we can write the above more succinctly as
Mic
1−σ
i ¼
Ei
Ew
eΠσ−1i :
eP1−σj ¼ X
i
Ei
Ew
eΠσ−1i t1−σi j τ ni j 1−σ :
Substituting in, we get the result.Appendix B. FTAs vs customs unions: robustness analysis
This section addresses a multicollinearity problem of indicators of
economic integration.24 In 2006, there were 1090 country pairs in
customs unions, 782 of which also formed a common market, and 208
an economic union. It may be difﬁcult to separately identify the effect
of each subgroup on trade.
Column 1 of Table B.9 regresses log total import value on an FTA in-
dicator and the same set of controls as in Table 4. Country pairs in FTAs
trade about twice asmuch as other comparable country pairs. Column 2
includes a separate indicator for customs unions. Since all customs
unions are also FTAs, the estimated effect of a customs union is in addi-
tion to the effect of being in an FTA. The estimated coefﬁcient is not sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero, hence, customs unions seem to trade
about as much as FTAs.
25 Note that the mode of transport will not be well deﬁned for a product/country pair if
there are no such shipments. This will not be a problem because this termwill carry a zero
weight in the index numbers below.
Table C.10
Decomposing trade into margins.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
total extensive within transport prodcomp
Total export + import
cost per shipment (log)
−0.677a −1.334b 0.380b −0.079 0.355a
(0.328) (0.257) (0.141) (0.063) (0.173)
Importer GDP (log) 0.975b 0.884b 0.089b 0.007 −0.005
(0.071) (0.045) (0.025) (0.011) (0.030)
Importer GDP per capita
PPP (log)
0.294a 0.299b 0.011 0.009 −0.026
(0.122) (0.088) (0.048) (0.021) (0.059)
Distance (log) −1.379b −1.347b 0.187a −0.091a −0.128
(0.200) (0.154) (0.084) (0.037) (0.104)
Importer is island
(dummy)
0.569c 0.450a 0.004 0.088 0.026
(0.326) (0.227) (0.125) (0.055) (0.153)
Former colony (dummy) −0.585 −0.248 −0.120 −0.002 −0.215
(0.418) (0.444) (0.244) (0.108) (0.299)
Common language
(dummy)
1.550b 1.487b −0.308 0.153 0.218
(0.457) (0.436) (0.240) (0.106) (0.294)
Common legal origin
(dummy)
0.923b 0.933b 0.274b −0.070 −0.214c
(0.229) (0.181) (0.100) (0.044) (0.122)
Bilateral tariff (log) 0.970 −1.396 0.720 −0.083 1.730
(2.295) (1.705) (0.937) (0.416) (1.150)
Constant −12.329b −4.720 −7.435b 1.062 −1.237
(3.707) (3.075) (1.690) (0.750) (2.074)
Observations 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.866 0.910 0.202 0.128 0.136
Note. Dependent variables are described in the text. The sample includes exports from
Spain to 124 non-EU countries in 2006. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a Signiﬁcant at 5%.
b Signiﬁcant at 1%.
c Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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data is collected differently. Whereas the source of trade data for extra-
EU trade is customs records, intra-EU trade ﬂows are measured via the
Intrastat ﬁrm survey. When we restrict the sample to country pairs for
which at least one of the countries is outside the EU (and trade is
hencemeasured via customs),we ﬁnd that tradewithin customsunions
is larger by 32% than trade in FTAs (see column 3). Consistent with this
explanation, trade is only lower for intra-EU trade, whereas the external
trade of EU countries is on average larger than that of similar countries
(column 4).
Because zero trade ﬂows are quite prevalent in the data, especially
for less integrated countries, we have also explored other econometric
speciﬁcations for the gravity equation. For countries outside an FTA,
44% of trade ﬂows are zero, so these observations are excluded from
the loglinear speciﬁcation. The fraction of zeros is only 5% for FTAmem-
bers, 9% for customs union members, and 2% for common market
members.
Column 5 reports the marginal effects of a probit speciﬁcation,
where the dependent variable is a dummy for nonzero trade ﬂow.
Even conditional on a rich set of covariates, FTA members are 5.5%
more likely to trade positive amounts; the probability of nonzero
trade is an additional 11% higher for customs union members.
Column 6 reports a Poisson speciﬁcation, which includes positive as
well as zero trade ﬂows. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue for this
speciﬁcation not only due to the presence of zeros, but also because it is
more robust to heteroskedasticity in trade. In this speciﬁcation, customs
union members trade 26% more than FTA members.
Taken together, we are conﬁdent that, conditional on our rich set of
covariates, expected trade volumes in customs unions are larger than in
FTAs.
Appendix C. A decomposition of aggregate exports
In this appendixwedevelop a decomposition of aggregate exports to
a country into four margins: the number of shipments, the shipment
size for a given product and transport mode, the transport mode, and
the product composition margins. The four margins separate fourpossible ways of adjustment. In response to higher administrative bar-
riers ﬁrmsmay reduce the number of shipments, pack larger quantities
of goods in one shipment, switch to a transport mode that allows larger
shipments (sea or ground), or change the export product mix towards
products that are typically shipped in large shipments.
Let g index products,mmodes of shipment (air, sea, ground), and j
importer countries. Let country 0 be the benchmark importer (the
average of all of the importers in the sample), for which the share of
product-level zeros are the lowest. In fact, we want all products to
have nonzero share, so that the share of different modes of transport
are well deﬁned for the benchmark country.25
Let njgm denote the number of shipments of good g throughmodem
going to country j. Similarly, qjgm denotes the average shipment size for
this trade ﬂow in quantity units, pjgm is the price per quantity unit. We
introduce the notation
s jgm ¼
njgmX
k
njgk
for the mode composition of good g in country j, and
s jg ¼
X
k
njgkX
l
X
k
njlk
for the product composition of country j. We deﬁne s0gm and s0g similar-
ly for the benchmark (average) importer.
We decompose the ratio of total trade value (X) to country j and the
benchmark country,
X j
X0
¼
X
g
X
m
njgmpjgmqjgmX
g
X
m
n0gmp0gmq0gm
¼
nj
X
g
s jg
X
m
sjgmpjgmqjgm
n0
X
g
s0g
X
m
s0gmp0gmq0gm;
as follows,
X j
X0
¼ nj
n0

X
g
s jg
X
m
sjgmpjgmqjgmX
g
s jg
X
m
sjgmp0gmq0gm

X
g
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
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s0gmp0gmq0gm
:
The ﬁrst term is the shipment extensive margin. It shows how the
number of shipments sent to j differs from the number of shipments
sent to the average importer. The ratio is greater than 1 if more than av-
erage shipments are sent to j. The second term is the within shipment
size margin. It tells how shipment sizes differ in the two countries for
the same product and mode of transport. The third term is a mode of
transportation margin. If it is greater than 1, transport modes that ac-
commodate larger-sized shipments (sea, ground) are overrepresented
in j relative to the benchmark country. The last term is the product
composition effect. It shows to what extent physical shipment sizes
differ in the two countries as a result of differences in the product
compositions. If bulky items and/or items that typically travel in large
shipments are overrepresented in the imports of j, the ratio gets larger
than 1.
We express the same decomposition identity simply as
X j;total ¼ X j;extensive  X j;within  X j;transport  X j;prodcomp: ðC:1Þ
If administrative trade barriers make ﬁrms send less and larger ship-
ments, one should see the shipment extensive margin to respond
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ministrative costs. If ﬁrms facing per shipment administrative costs
choose to switch to a large-shipment transport mode, the transport
margin should respond positively. If ﬁrms shift the composition of the
traded productmix towards typically large shipment products, it should
show up as a positive response on the product composition margin.
We run simple cross section regressionswith elements of decompo-
sition (B.1) (in logs) on the left-hand side and the log total shipping cost
(fij) and other “gravity” regressors on the right-hand side. The estimat-
ing equation is
ln X j;z ¼ β  ln f i j þ γ  other regressors j þ ν þ η j; ðC:2Þ
where z ∈ [total, extensive, within, transport, prodcomp] denotes the
different margins, v is a constant and ηj is the error term. Additional
regressors include GDP, GDP per capita, distance, bilateral tariff rates,
geographic and cultural variables. We estimate (C.2) with simple OLS
and robust standard errors in the case of the total margin. In the
case of the ﬁve margins, we exploit the correlatedness of the errors
and apply Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Estimation (SURE). The
Breusch–Pagan test always rejects the independence of errors.
Similarly to the results reported in Table 4, higher shipping costs are
associatedwith lower trade volumes (column 1 of Table C.10). The neg-
ative relation is even stronger for the number of shipments: a 1% in-
crease in shipping costs is associated with a 1.3% decline in the
number of shipments, holding the mode of transportation and product
composition ﬁxed (column 2). The shipments going to high administra-
tive barrier countries tend to be larger, both for a given product (column
3), and because of a tendency to send bulkier products (column 5).
However, there is no signiﬁcant response of themode of transportation
(column 4).
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